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THE f ORHGN POU CY Of THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
Terrorism and the Prnmotion of Democracy 
JAMES M. MCCORMICK 
D uring the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush announced that he would pursue a "distinctly American internationalism" in foreign policy (Bush i999a), largely in contrast to the liberal interna-tionalism of the Clinton administration. He initially sought to have 
a foreign policy that placed greater emphasis on American national inter-
ests than on global interests. The 9/11 attacks quickly changed both the 
content of the administration's foreign policy and the process by which 
American foreign policy was made. As a result, the administration pur-
sued a foreign policy that was universal in scope and that viewed virtu-
ally all international actions as affecting American interests. The efforts 
to build a "coalition of the willing" to find and defeat "terrorists and ty-
rants" on a worldwide scale illustrated the universal nature of this policy, 
but the difficulties that the invasion and occupation of Iraq created also 
demonstrated the limitation of this policy approach. At the beginning of 
its second term, the Bush administration reiterated its commitment to de-
A substantial portion of this chapter is drawn from James M. McCormick, "American Foreign 
Policy after September 11: The George W. Bush Administration," chap. 6 of American Fortign 
Policy and Process, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning Wadsworth, 2009). 
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mocratization worldwide as yet another way to combat global terrorism, 
and it initiated some actions toward that goal. Yet the Bush administra-
tion's foreign policy efforts were largely overshadowed by the continuing 
occupation oflraq and the failure to bring that war to an end. 
The Bush administration's foreign policy employed several approaches 
over its two terms-one used prior to 9/11, one adopted after 9/11, and one 
at the beginning of the second term, when the administration attempted 
to modify its most recent approach. The first approach was informed by 
the Bush administration's assumptions and policy positions and its initial 
commitment to classical realism. After 9/11, the administration moved to-
ward defensive realism and idealism in foreign policy, as enunciated in the 
Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine underwent an apparent modification 
at the beginning of the second term with the introduction of a "democ-
racy initiative.'' Each approach has left its impact on the future of Ameri-
can foreign policy. 
An important point of departure for understanding the initial foreign 
policy approach of the George W. Bush administration is to consider the 
foreign policy legacies that he inherited from the Clinton administration 
and from his father's (George H. W. Bush) administration. Both of those 
previous administrations experienced the seismic foreign policy shock 
that the end of the cold war wrought, and both administrations sought 
to put their own stamp on the new American foreign policy that would 
replace the anti-Soviet and anti-communist principles that had informed 
U.S. policy for so long. One stamp left the imprint of political realism, 
while the other left the imprint of liberal internationalism. Neither ad-
ministration was wholly successful in setting the United States on a new 
foreign policy course, and, in this sense, both left different kinds oflega-
cies for the George W. Bush administration. 
An Initial Belief in Classical Realism 
Because the George W. Bush administration was more inclined toward a 
foreign policy approach closer to that of his father's administration, the 
Clinton foreign policy legacies were generally not welcomed by the new 
Bush administration. Indeed, those legacies were a target of attack by can-
didate Bush and his foreign policy advisers since they represented a more 
universal and multilateral approach than the new Bush administration 
envisioned. Instead, George W. Bush was initially more inclined toward a 
foreign policy of classical realism. 
Classical realism originates in several important assumptions about 
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states and state behavior that had direct implications for the Bush admin-
istration's initial foreign policy approach. First, classical realists assume 
that states are the principal actors in foreign policy and that actions be-
tween states would trump any efforts to change behaviors within states. 
In this sense, the quality of relations between states is the major way in 
which to evaluate a country's foreign policy, and American policy would 
focus principally on state-to-state relations. Second, a state's "interests are 
determined by its power (meaning its material resources) relative to other 
nations" (Zakaria 1998, 8-9). As a state's relative power increases, it would 
seek to expand its political influence, albeit based upon a careful cost/ 
benefit analysis. In this regard, American power can and should be used 
to restrain states that could clearly harm the United States and its inter-
ests, but American power should be used carefully and selectively. Third, 
classical realists focus upon managing relations among the major pow-
ers, since these states are the ones that are likely to be the major threats in 
the international system. A guiding principle for realists is that no great 
power, or coalition of great powers, should dominate or endanger a na-
tion or a group of nations. In this sense, the United States should focus on 
strengthening its alliances and on challenging some states, but it should 
do so in a highly prudent and selective manner. 
These assumptions largely informed the types of policies that the 
George W. Bush administration initially supported or opposed when it 
took office in 2001. First of all, George W. Bush came to office as a par-
ticular kind of internationalist, one who sought to develop a "distinctly 
American internationalism." What that phrase implied was a much nar-
rower definition of the American national interest than that of his imme-
diate predecessor and even of his father's presidency (Bush 1999a). Second, 
candidate Bush made clear that a top priority of his administration would 
be to refurbish America's alliance structure around the world as a tangible 
manifestation of managing great power relationships. Europe and Asia 
would be the highest foreign policy priorities, since those regions con-
tain longtime allies-and potential rivals. Third, Russia and China would 
be viewed in a more skeptical way than the Clinton administration had 
done, and American military capacity would be important for exercis-
ing American influence with these nations. Fourth, "hard power" would 
be preferred over "soft power" for dealing with the international system 
(Bush 1999b). Hard power refers to the utility of military capacity, sanc-
tioning behavior, and threat behavior, among other coercive measures, as 
ways to influence the behavior of nations. Soft power relies upon the ap-
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peal of American culture and American values to enable the United States 
to influence the behavior of other states. Fifth, in concert with refurbish-
ing alliances and the use of hard .power, the remaking and strengthening 
of the American military would be a top priority for the new adminis-
tration, both in terms of increased military pay and increased military 
spending. 
The assumptions of classical realism also pointed to the policies that 
the Bush administration initially opposed. Most fundamentally, the new 
administration, largely in contrast to the Clinton administration, sought 
to narrow the number of American actions around the world and focus 
only on strategically important ones. First, the United States would not be 
as involved in trying to change other slates internally or create political 
democracy within other countries. As Bush stated, "We value the elegant 
structures of our own democracy- but realize that, in other societies, 
the architecture will vary. We propose our principles, but we must not 
impose our culture" (Bush i999a). Second, Bush opposed American hu-
manitarian interventions without a clear strategic rationale for being in-
volved in such missions. The American military, Condoleezza Rice stated, 
is neither "a civilian police force" nor "a political referee" in internecine 
and communal conflicts (Rice 2000, 53). Indeed, during the 2000 elec-
tion campaign, Bush and others demonstrated this position by indicat-
ing a willingness to pull back from American involvement in Middle East 
discussions and, later, by deciding to move away from negotiations with 
North Korea during the administration's first months in office. Third, the 
Bush administration eschewed involvement with international institu-
tions and opposed several key international agreements- rejecting the 
Kyoto Protocol to control global warming, opposing the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, and indicating its willingness to withdraw from the i972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to deploy national missile 
defense. Fourth, the Bush administration was not inclined to afford much 
influence to Congress or America's allies in the conduct of foreign policy. 
Instead, executive power in foreign affairs would be reasserted. 
Reviving Wilsonianism after 9/11 
Much as December 7, 1941, was a "day of infamy" for an earlier generation 
of Americans, September 11, 2001, became such a day for the millennial 
generation. Indeed, it is one of those days that has prompted every Ameri-
can to remember forever where they were and what they were doing when 
they first heard about the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pen-
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tagon. From an analytic point of view, the events of that day represent one 
of those rare and spectacular political events that can change the mind-set 
or the image of the public and its leaders regarding foreign policy. Such 
"watershed" events are rare indeed, as one political scientist noted many 
years ago, but when they do occur, they can reverse or change the views 
of a whole generation or even several (Deutsch i966, 5-26). Yet 9/11 ap-
pears to rank at the top end of these spectacular events not only because 
of its pervasive effect on the generation being socialized to politics at the 
time but also for the leveling effect it had on foreign policy beliefs across 
generations. 
The 9/11 attacks had such a profound effect for at least three reasons. 
First, they were the first substantial attack upon the American continen-
tal homeland since the burning of Washington in the War of 1812. The 
American public had always assumed the security of the U.S. homeland, 
and these events shattered that assumption. Second, 9/11 was fundamen-
tally an attack upon American civilians, not military personnel (although, 
to be sure, military personnel were killed at the Pentagon). Even the at-
tack on Pearl Harbor had been directed primarily at military personnel. 
Third, and importantly, the terrorist attack was the deadliest in American 
history-costing almost three thousand lives and surpassing the total at 
Pearl Harbor by almost one thousand deaths. In all, then, 9/11 had a pro-
found and pronounced effect, whether measured by the changed attitudes 
among the American public toward foreign policy, the changed agenda 
within Congress and new levels of support for the president on foreign 
policy issues, or the changed nature of the presidency itself. 
Effects on the President 
While the impacts on the public and Congress certainly merit attention 
and analysis and have been analyzed elsewhere (McCormick 2006), the 
effects on George W. Bush and his foreign policy approach are the focus 
here. Indeed, the impact of these events was evident at both the personal 
and policy levels. At a personal level. for instance, President Bush dictated 
for his diary on the night of those tragic events that "the Pearl Harbor of 
the 21st century took place today" (from Woodward 2002, 37). With that 
assessment, the president appeared to realize that "he was now a wartime 
president," as Bob Woodward (2002, 37) noted, with all the implications 
of that judgment for his leadership. Fred Greenstein (2004), a longtime 
scholar of the presidency, argues that Bush's cognitive style and his effec-
tiveness with the public were the areas most affected by the events of that 
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day. His emotional intelligence was strengthened in that Bush was able to 
face this national tragedy, and his political skills were sharpened by his 
need to try to put together a coalition against terrorism. Thomas Preston 
and Margaret Hermann reach a similar conclusion: "[Bush's] normal lack 
of interest in foreign affairs and desire to delegate the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy to others, which had been the dominant 
pattern within his advisory system before the terrorist attacks, was forced 
to give way to his current, more active and involved pattern" (Preston and 
Hermann 2004, 370). Political psychologist Stanley Renshon, too, argues 
that 9/11 was a transforming moment for President Bush: "Those moments 
[on 9/11) changed the public's view of the Bush presidency, the president's 
view of the presidency, and, crucially, the president himself." Those events 
helped Bush find "his place and his purpose," Renshon writes, and Bush 
then "turned his efforts toward transforming America's place in the world 
and the world in which America has its place" (Renshon 2008, 386). 
Effects on Policy 
Indeed, the Bush administration's approach to foreign policy and its con-
tent changed almost overnight. While 9/11 ironically confirmed some of 
the administration's assumptions about the world and its approach (e.g., 
the importance of hard power over soft power and the need for enhanced 
military preparedness), they also suggested the limitations of the Bush ad-
ministration's commitment to classical realism. While the administration 
did not do a volte-face in its policy, it did change from classical realism to 
what we would describe as "defensive realism," yet it also incorporated a 
distinct form of idealism into its approach. 
While defensive realism makes many of the same assumptions as clas-
sical realism, it differs in one important aspect: the importance of"insecu-
rity" as the motivating force for state actions. Fareed Zakaria summarizes 
the fundamental difference when he compares defensive realism and clas-
sical realism: "While the latter implies that states expand out of confi-
dence, or at least out of an awareness of increased resources, the former 
maintains that states expand out of fear and nervousness. For the classical 
realist, states expand because they can; for the defensive realist, states ex-
pand because they must" (Zakaria 1998, 8-9). The new threatening envi-
ronment after 9/11 thus propelled the Bush administration to change some 
of its foreign policy assumptions and actions- and eventually to create a 
new security strategy statement that incorporated elements of defensive 
realism rather than classical realism. 
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Combined with this new defensive realism, the Bush administration 
also embraced a form of idealism in foreign affairs, especially as it related 
to combating international terrorism in the post-9/11 era. A nation pur-
suing an idealistic foreign policy approach is motivated by a moral im-
perative in its actions and seeks to promote common values within and 
across states. In this sense, foreign policy became more than state-to-state 
relations among the strong for the Bush administration, which instead 
began seeking to advance universal norms. That is, the Bush administra-
tion sought to promote a worldwide imperative against terrorism, even 
as it also pursued greater global democratization. As such, it became in-
creasingly concerned about the actions of all states (and groups) and the 
internal composition of many states, especially their attitude toward ter-
rorism. Put somewhat differently, the administration appeared to em-
brace the more idealistic Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy, 
albeit an idealism driven rather singularly on the imperative of combating 
international terrorism and doing so in a particular way (for a critique, see 
Dorrien 2003). 
This change in approach-and the Bush administration's combining 
of realism and idealism-could be described as essentially the adoption of 
the key assumptions of what Francis Fukuyama (2006) labeled the "neo-
conservative legacy." The administration came to accept that the "internal 
characteristics of regimes matter" in the conduct of foreign policy, that 
American power and capabilities can and should be used for moral pur-
poses even within states, and that international institutions and interna-
tional law should be viewed skeptically in the conduct of foreign policy. At 
the same time, the Bush administration continued to view with suspicion 
any social engineering undertaken by governments (Fukuyama 2006, 48-
49). In another analysis, Walter Russell Mead (2005) labels the Bush ad-
ministration adherents of these views as "Revival Wilsonians." That is, 
they supported the spread of democracy and the goodness of American 
intentions and actions, albeit without the embrace of international law 
and institutions, as Wilson initially proposed. Hence, a revamped Wil-
sonianism is the result, driven fundamentally by domestic American 
values and implemented primarily by American power and American 
unilateralism. 
With this change in approach after 9/11, three initial foreign policy as-
sumptions were changed. First, and perhaps most significantly, the Bush 
administration moved from a narrow or particularistic foreign policy ap-
proach to a more universal one. That is, it moved from a focus on narrow-
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ing American national interests to a focus on broadening them to combat 
international terrorism. Second, the Bush administration initially moved 
away from its rather narrowly defined unilateralist approach to American 
foreign policy and toward a greater multilateral effort, albeit a multilater-
alism with a unilateralist option for the United States. While the United 
States sought to pursue multilateral goals, President Bush threatened to 
act unilaterally if multilateral support did not develop-much as the ini-
tiation of the war against Iraq would demonstrate. Third, the adminis-
tration moved from its reliance on a starkly realist approach to foreign 
policy-without much concern about the internal dynamics of states-to 
a version of idealism-with a clear concern about the internal dynamics 
of some states. In this regard, humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping 
efforts, and peacemaking actions within states had now become part and 
parcel of the Bush foreign policy approach, which was not unlike that of 
his immediate predecessor. 
Several administration actions provide evidence of these changes in 
assumptions. President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress shortly 
after 9/11 and called for a new universalism. Instead of embracing a "dis-
tinctly American internationalism," President Bush now adopted what 
might be called a "comprehensive American globalism," albeit defined 
and animated by the moral outrage against the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon. President Bush committed the Unititd 
States to fight terrorism and states that support terrorism, and he out-
lined the nature of the global struggle in stark and dichotomous terms-
in words reminiscent of the Truman Doctrine. The struggle, he noted, 
was now between the way of terror and the way of freedom, between states 
that support terror and those that do not, and between an uncivilized and 
a civilized world (Bush 20oia). 
At the same time, President Bush conveyed the initial multilateral im-
pulse of this new foreign policy approach and took several steps to imple-
ment such an approach against al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
The administration adopted a coalitional approach to taking on al-Qaida 
and the Taliban effort, put the coalition together quickly, and incorpo-
rated an array of participants (U.S. Department of State 20oia). 
By the time that military operations commenced in Afghanistan on 
October 7, 2001, several allied countries (Britain, Canada, Australia, Ger-
many, and France, among others) pledged to assist with the operation. 
And more than forty nations, by that time, had approved American over-
flights and landing rights (U.S. Department of State 20oia; 2001b; U.S. 
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Embassy Islamabad 2002). These expressions of assistance came from the 
several continents and regions (Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Asia). In 
all, "Operation Anaconda" in Afghanistan eventually included contribu-
tions from some twenty countries. It quickly proved successful in break-
ing the Taliban's control in Afghanistan, and that country made progress 
toward democracy and reconstruction for a time. By 2007 and 2008, how-
ever, the Taliban was resurgent and posed an increasing problem for the 
outgoing Bush administration and the incoming Obama administration. 
The Bush administration also undertook actions regarding commu-
nal and regional conflicts. While the decision to focus upon the internal 
situation in Afghanistan is hardly surprising in light of 9/11, the extent 
to which the administration committed itself to changing or to assist in 
changing the domestic situations in a series of other countries was sur-
prising. Examples ranged from the effort to challenge the "axis of evil" 
countries-Iran, Iraq, and North Korea-to the commitments of send-
ing personnel for military training as well as advisory units to several 
countries throughout the world-the Philippines, Yemen, Georgia-and 
to efforts to use American naval power around Somalia to block possi-
ble escaping al-Qaida fighters. Furthermore, the administration initiated 
some efforts at conflict resolution in the Middle East and between India 
and Pakistan and also opened up discussions with North Korea. At the 
same time, the administration was willing to look past some internal is-
sues in other nations (e.g., China, Russia, and Pakistan), especially their 
human rights conditions, since their cooperation in the war on terrorism 
was more important than the differences that this Bush administration 
initially expressed about them. 
In sum, the new approach, quickly labeled the Bush Doctrine, sought 
to hunt down terrorists, and those that supported terrorists, on a world-
wide scale. While cooperation and support from other countries would be 
sought, the United States would go it alone if necessary. The globalism of 
this effort and the motivation for its actions represent the major transfor-
mations of the policy approach of the Bush administration after 9/11. 
Formalizing the Bush Doctrine in 
the National Security Strategy Statement 
While its statements and actions conveyed the new foreign policy ap -
proach, the Bush administration issued a fuller rationale for its policy 
direction almost exactly one year after 9/11. "The National Security Strat-
egy Statement of the United States of America" (2002) postulated that the 
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fundamental aim of American foreign policy was "to create a balance of 
power that favors freedom." To create such a balance, the administration 
asserted that the United States "will defend the peace by fighting terrorists 
and tyrants[,) ... will preserve peace by building good relations among 
the great powers[,] ... [and] will extend the peace by encouraging free 
and open societies on every continent." The statement demonstrates how 
much American actions would now be motivated by the new threaten-
ing environment, much as defensive realism would postulate. The policy 
statement also conveyed the idealist and universal nature of this proposed 
foreign policy agenda with its concerns for the internal make-up and op-
erations of states and groups. The United States, it noted, "is now threat-
ened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones ... less by fleets 
and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embit-
tered few," but it also recognized and accepted the fact that the United 
States "possesses unprecedented- and unequaled-strength and influ-
ence in the world" and acknowledged that "this position comes with un-
paralleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity." 
The Bush administration outlined seven courses of action to promote 
this fundamental goal of promoting freedom and advancing the "nonne-
gotiable demands of human dignity." These included seeking to rally na-
tions and alliances around the world to defeat terrorism (and relying on a 
broad array of actions to do so); addressing (with the goal of resolving) re-
gional conflicts to reduce their impact on global stability; and focusing on 
those "rogue states" and terrorists who might gain access to weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). The administration indicated, moreover, that 
it would seek to lead a broad coalition-"as broad as practicable"-to pro-
mote a balance of power in favor of freedom (National Security Strategy 
2002). This coalition would consist not only of traditional American al-
lies but also Russia, India, and China as well as others. In addition, the 
national security strategy statement included U.S. commitments to ignite 
global economic growth, fundamentally through free trade initiatives but 
also through increased development assistance and an expansion of the 
number of global democracies. Finally, the document called for trans-
forming national security institutions at home. The priorities were to 
improve the military and the intelligence communities and strengthen 
homeland security to meet the demands of defending peace at home and 
abroad. While there was a brief mention of improving diplomacy and the 
Department of State, the emphasis was more on the "hard power" agen-
cies than the "soft power" ones. 
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In what became the most controversial statements in the document, 
the Bush administration asserted first that the United States must have 
available "the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to 
our national security." In addition, the statement concluded by emphasiz-
ing the commitment of the Bush administration to act unilaterally if col-
lective efforts fail: "In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, 
judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be pre-
pared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require" 
(National Security Strategy 2002). These statements concerning preemp-
tion and the unilateral option would ultimately gain most of the critical 
attention at home and abroad and would soon undermine the adminis-
tration's initial effort to produce a "grand strategy" against terrorism with 
broad support. 
America's allies, friends, and even adversaries initially supported the 
Bush administration's new foreign policy approach after 9/11. The ac-
knowledgment that the Bush administration needed other states to fight 
terrorism, its initial turn to international institutions, and the recognition 
of multiple actors in the international arena undoubtedly struck a respon-
sive chord. Furthermore, the concern with the internal dynamics of some 
states and the need to address festering regional and communal conflicts 
also met with some receptivity in Europe and elsewhere. After all, Article 
V of the NATO pact ("an armed attack against one ... should be consid-
ered an attack against ... all") was invoked for the first time in the history 
of the fifty-year alliance, immediately after 9/11, and virtually all Euro-
pean nations agreed to provide some assistance against al-Qaida and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. 
This international receptivity, however, was short lived. The 2002 State 
of the Union address, in which President Bush identified the "axis of evil" 
nations and appeared to foreshadow actions against one or more of them, 
caused some immediate alarm. As the French foreign minister, Hubert 
Vedrine, noted at the time, "We are currently threatened by a simplified 
approach which reduces all problems of the world to the mere struggle 
against terrorism." Javier Solana Madariaga, the European Union's min-
ister for foreign affairs, warned about the "dangers of global unilateral-
ism," and the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, called the "axis of 
evil" notion a concept "not in accordance with our political ethos" (from 
Schwarz 2002). In the ensuing months of 2002, as Iraq, one of the axis of 
evil nations, increasingly drew the attention of President Bush and key 
American policymakers, further concerns were expressed over the di-
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rection of American policy, both at home and abroad. Although Saddam 
Hussein's regime had used chemical and biological weapons against its 
own people in the past and had started a nuclear program, Iraq's links to 
terrorists were seemingly tenuous. 
By summer 2002, the issue of Iraq had set off a pitched debate within 
the administration. Some key advisers supported quick and unilateral 
action to remove Saddam Hussein, while others, most prominently Sec-
retary Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, argued that this ap-
proach had "risks and complexities" that needed more analysis (Purdum 
and Tyler 2002). Such discussion of war against Saddam also alienated Re-
publican allies in Congress and officials from previous administrations, 
notably former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and former national se-
curity adviser Brent Scowcroft. While these officials supported the need to 
remove Saddam Hussein, they were concerned that the administration's 
approach risked "alienating allies, creating greater instability in the Mid-
dle East, and harming long-term American interests" (Purdum and Tyler 
2002). Indeed, the Europeans, too, were becoming increasingly leery of 
America's future intentions and its policy. 
Iraq and the Bush Doctrine 
A series of actions that began in the fall of 2002 only accelerated these do-
mestic and international concerns and ultimately moved the Bush admin-
istration toward unilateral action against Iraq. First, the national security 
strategy statement of September 2002, with its use of preemption and the 
"go it alone" language, quickly alarmed many. Second, President Bush 
(2002a) issued a challenge to the international community at the United 
Nations to address the issue of WMD in Iraq and hinted that the United 
States would act alone if necessary. To be sure, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1441 unanimously on November 8, 2002, finding Iraq 
in "material breach" of previous UN Resolution 687, but it also called for 
more international inspections. Over the next several months, the chief 
inspectors provided reports to the UN Security Council on the status of 
the inspections and the disarmament activities. In all, these reports indi-
cated that Iraq was not fully complying with the resolution and with the 
inspectors. The inspectors requested more time from the Security Council 
to continue their work. As a result, real divisions emerged among the UN 
Security Council members on how to address the Iraq issue. Third, with 
the White House's support, Congress passed a sweeping resolution that 
authorized the president to use American military forces against Iraq "as 
251 
JAMES M. McCORMICK 
he determines to be necessary and appropriate" to defend the national se-
curity of the United States and to enforce "all relevant United Nations Se-
curity Council resolutions regarding Iraq." Fourth, and very importantly, 
by March 2003, the Bush administration's patience had run out on the 
failure of the UN Security Council to act against Iraq. At the urging of 
the Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, the United States, Britain, 
and Spain circulated another draft UN resolution to once again find Iraq 
in "material breach" and, implicitly, to get approval for military action to 
enforce UN Resolution i441. This resolution never reached a vote, since 
several nations on the UN Security Council, led principally by French op-
position and the potential use of its veto, indicated that they would not 
support it. 
As a result, President Bush issued an ultimatum to Iraq and its lead-
ership on March q, 2003: "Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq 
within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, com-
menced at a time of our choosing" (Bush 2003b). When the Iraqi leader-
ship refused to comply with the ultimatum, the United States attacked a 
command bunker in Baghdad, and the war, called "Operation Iraqi Free-
dom," had begun. The president took this action without another UN 
resolution and instead relied upon the congressional resolution passed in 
October 2002 and his constitutional authority as commander in chief. To 
be sure, the administration put together a "coalition of the willing" (some 
forty-two nations initially), much as the national security strategy state-
ment of a few months earlier had implied. Yet the United States and the 
United Kingdom carried out the principal military action, with some as-
sistance from Australia and a few other countries. In all areas, the Bush 
administration was willing to act alone (or with an informal coalition) in 
addressing the issues of tyrants and terrorists and in implementing its na-
tional security strategy. 
The war campaign went well and progressed quickly for the United 
States and Great Britain, with the loss of relatively few lives. The United 
States gained control of Baghdad by April 9, only three weeks after the 
war's initiation, and President Bush declared "major combat operations" 
over on May i. Still, "winning the peace" and establishing a stable dem-
ocratic government proved extraordinarily difficult. Indeed, Americans 
continued to be wounded and killed over the following months as Iraqi 
resistance remained-and increased. Equally challenging was the effort 
to uncover clear evidence of the existence of weapons of mass destruction, 
the fundamental rationale for the war. As a result, the Bush administra-
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tion's foreign policy quickly came under greater scrutiny and criticism by 
the summer of 2003. 
Criticism of the Bush foreign policy approach arose from the bureau-
cracy and Capitol Hill at home and from several sources abroad. At home, 
some charged that the administration had skewed intelligence data to sup-
port its desire to pursue the war against Iraq or had pressured intelligence 
analysts to provide supportive estimates (see Pillar 2008). And the Penta-
gon was accused of developing its own "hard-line view of intelligence re-
lated to Iraq" to justify American military actions there (see, e.g., Schmitt 
2003). While the Bush administration denied such charges, skeptics re-
mained, and Congress initiated inquiries into these matters. By July 2003, 
the administration was forced to admit that a passage in the president's 
State of the Union address regarding Iraq's efforts to obtain uranium 
from an African nation was not supported by American intelligence (see 
Sanger and Risen 2003). In general, the integrity of the Bush administra-
tion's policymaking was called into question, and the Senate Intelligence 
Committee called hearings to investigate. By this time, too, foreign policy 
arose in the incipient 2004 presidential election campaign. Representa-
tive Richard Gephardt, for example, charged the president with "stunning 
incompetence" in the area of foreign policy (from Beaumont 2003), and 
Senator John Kerry, the eventual Democratic nominee in 2004, accused 
the administration of failing to have a plan to "win the peace" in Iraq and 
pointed to the "arrogant absence of any major international effort to build 
what's needed" in Iraq (from Baiz 2003, A6). 
Abroad, allies and adversaries alike continued to criticize Bush ad-
ministration policy. Critics disliked the administration's pursuit of uni-
lateral policies without considering the views of other states. Arguably, 
these criticisms accelerated after two particular actions the American 
government pursued during this period. The first action was the hold-
ing of "enemy combatants" at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in solitary con-
finement, without access to counsel and without charges. These prisoners 
were denied basic rights, critics charged, seemingly in violation of the Ge-
neva Conventions. Furthermore, these prisoners were subject to vigorous 
interrogation measures that constituted torture or bordered on it. The sec-
ond action was the revelation in April 2004 of the appalling treatment of 
Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Photographs showed American military 
members humiliating Iraq prisoners by requiring them to parade naked, 
making them pose with nooses around their necks, and using dogs to 
frighten them. 
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The Bush administration sought to deflect some of these criticisms 
by engaging in diplomatic initiatives on other pressing regional and in-
ternational problems during 2003 and 2004. First, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the administration issued its "roadmap for peace" between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians in April 2003 and promptly began to work on 
implementing it; President Bush traveled to the Middle East to give impe-
tus to this road map. Second, in May 2003, the Bush administration won 
approval of UN Security Council Resolution i483, which lifted sanctions 
against Iraq and encouraged other nations and international institutions 
to assist with the reconstruction of that nation. Third, President Vladimir 
Putin of Russia and President Bush exchanged instruments of ratification 
for another strategic arms reduction treaty in June 2003, signaling con-
tinued cooperation with a nation that had opposed the Iraq war. Fourth, 
and also in June 2003, President Bush met with European leaders at the 
G-8 summit (and most notably with French president Jacques Chirac) to 
begin to repair the rift with alliance partners that the war against Iraq had 
created. Finally, President Bush went on a five-day trip to Africa in July 
2003, becoming only the third American president to visit that continent, 
to promote his AIDS/HIV initiative and to demonstrate a broader foreign 
policy agenda than the war on terrorism had connoted. 
None of these actions, though, reflected a fundamental shift in pol-
icy approach by the Bush administration from the one adopted after 9/11. 
Indeed, terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia and Morocco in the spring 
of 2003 (and attributed to al-Qaida) and the Madrid train bombings of 
March 11, 2004, only reinforced the administration's stance. The mount-
ing criticism at home and abroad of the administration's unilateral and 
ideological approach appeared to introduce a more cautionary note in 
considering further military responses, whether against North Korea, 
Iran, or another entity. And presidential popularity had declined to the 
levels of prior to 9/11, and support for the Iraq war was beginning to wane 
by late 2004. Still, the policy slogan was "stay the course." That slogan 
applied to the policy in Iraq, but it applied equally to the unique combi-
nation of defensive realism and limited idealism that the Bush adminis-
tration had adopted in the post-9/11 period. 
A New Foreign Policy Approach for the Second Term? 
George W. Bush was able to obtain a narrow victory in the 2004 presi-
dential election, and his anti-terrorist foreign policy stance contributed 
to that success. In the aftermath of that election victory, though, the Bush 
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administration initially sought to alter its foreign policy approach, includ-
ing the war on terrorism. The initial hint of a change in approach came in 
a meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair shortly after Bush's reelection. 
At the end of that meeting, President Bush declared that "[in] my second 
term, I will work to deepen our trans-Atlantic ties to nations of Europe." 
He also declared that stronger ties between Europe and America were vi-
tal to the "promotion of worldwide democracy" (from Stout 2004, i, 4; see 
also McCormick 2006 for some of the themes developed in this section). 
The Democracy Imperative 
President Bush more fully signaled a modified approach in his second in-
augural address and in his State of the Union address a few weeks later. In 
the inaugural address, for example, he directly tied America's well-being 
to the expansion of freedom and liberty around the world. America and 
the world would be secure only by promoting these ideas and by recon-
structing the international system with them. "The survival of liberty in 
our land," he declared, "increasingly depends on the success of liberty in 
other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of free-
dom in the world." Later in that address he added, "It is the policy of the 
United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements 
and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of 
ending tyranny in the world" (Bush 2005a). 
In his State of the Union address a short time later, President Bush 
continued to link America's well-being at home and the promotion of 
freedom abroad. A principal goal for his administration, he declared, 
would be "to pass along to our children all the freedoms we enjoy-and 
chief among them is freedom from fear." Key passages from this address 
convey these sentiments: "Pursuing our enemies is a vital commitment of 
the war on terror ... [but] in the long term, the peace we seek will only be 
achieved by eliminating the conditions that feed radicalism and ideolo-
gies of murder. If whole regions of the world remain in despair and grow 
in hatred, they will be recruiting grounds for terror, and that terror will 
stalk America and other free nations for decades. The only force power-
ful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with 
hope, is the force of human freedom" (Bush 2005b). 
Furthermore, President Bush emphasized that this transformational 
foreign policy would not be imposed from abroad or implemented by mil-
itary means. Instead, this change would need to be evoked, or encour-
aged, by the global community. 
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At her Senate confirmation hearings in early 2005, Condoleezza Rice, 
too, was quick to outline some new central themes of the administration: 
to unite, strengthen, and spread democracies around the world and to do 
so through diplomacy. In her words, "We must use American diplomacy 
to help create a balance of power in the world that favors freedom. And the 
time for diplomacy is now" (U.S. Congress 2005). To be sure, such themes 
were not entirely new for the Bush administration. After all, the notion of 
creating "a balance of power favoring freedom" is seemingly straight out 
of the national security strategy statement (2002), and promoting democ-
racy was a theme that President Bush enunciated in his visit to Britain in 
November 2003, when he called for the "global expansion of democracy" 
to be a key pillar of American security (Bush 2003d). 
What was new, however, was the initial effort that President Bush 
and Condoleezza Rice, the new secretary of state, undertook to try to as-
suage allies, particularly the Europeans. Secretary Rice's "peace offensive" 
to several European capitals was one such step. It was generally well re-
ceived, and it continued from there. By one analysis, Secretary Rice vis-
ited forty-nine countries in her first year as secretary of state and "nearly 
70 percent of Rice's time abroad in 2005 was spent in Europe" (Gordon 
2006, 81). President Bush, too, sought to send a different signal to the Eu-
ropeans in 2005 by visiting NATO and European Union headquarters and 
by having long meetings with two key European skeptics of the Bush ap-
proach adopted after 9/u: French president Jacques Chirac and German 
chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. 
Changes in Personnel and Policy Actions 
The administration also made changes in foreign policy personnel at home 
as part of this seemingly new direction. Key neoconservatives (Paul Wolf-
owitz and Doug Feith at Defense and John Bolton at State) left, and new 
pragmatists and foreign policy realists took their places (Gordon 2006, 
81-82). In particular, Robert Zoellick was appointed deputy secretary of 
state, Nicholas Burns assumed the number-three position as undersec-
retary of state for political affairs, and Christopher Hill became assistant 
secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs (and eventually the lead 
American negotiator with North Korea). 
Multilateral diplomatic initiatives were also established or restarted 
toward two "axis of evil" countries: Iran and North Korea. Partly as a 
result of President Bush's trip to Europe in 2005, the "EU-3"-France, 
Germany, and Great Britain-agreed to work with the United States on 
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a diplomatic initiative with Iran to forestall the country's potential de-
velopment of nuclear weapons. This initiative ultimately led to a series of 
economic sanctions against Iran and to considerable unity among these 
key allies and the United States over the next three years. This multilateral 
diplomatic approach remained the principal foreign policy vehicle for the 
Bush administration during the balance of its second term, despite some 
of the administration's rhetoric to the contrary. 
By mid-2005, too, the "Six-Party Talks" over North Korea's develop-
ment of nuclear weapons were resurrected, even though the North Ko-
reans had declared several months earlier that they were "indefinitely 
suspending" them. Indeed, by mid-September 2005, all parties reaffirmed 
that the goal of the talks should be the "verifiable denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner" (U.S. Department of State 2008). 
While the Six-Party Talks experienced ups and down over the next three 
years (including UN-imposed sanctions over a North Korean nuclear test), 
the talks ultimately resulted in an agreement in 2007 about the phased 
shutdown, and eventual dismantlement, of North Korean nuclear facili-
ties. The timely implementation of these agreements, however, eluded the 
Bush administration. Nonetheless, the Bush administration largely fol-
lowed this diplomatic course with this "axis of evil" state. 
Finally, several other modest changes in the Bush administration's for-
eign policy approach near the beginning of the second term, and more re-
cently, suggested a slightly different course. Some changes were made in 
the administration's position on foreign aid, especially in providing more 
aid for Africa, and on climate change, including a statement that it was 
"largely a man-made problem." Halting steps of change were also evident 
in the administration's working with international organizations; there 
were some favorable actions vis-a-vis the International Criminal Court 
and UN efforts to solve the Darfur problem in Sudan (Gordon 2006, 83). 
In 2007 and 2008, the Bush administration made a new drive to prompt 
some headway in Middle East peace negotiations between the Palestinians 
and the Israelis, although these efforts were largely stalled after the Israeli 
invasion of Gaza in January 2009. The administration also worked col-
lectively with NATO allies for expansion of that organization once again, 
although it did not succeed in getting all the new members desired. StiJI, 
by 2008, the administration was gaining unanimous support from the 
European NATO allies for the placement of a missile shield in Poland and 
the Czech Republic, even in the face of repeated Russian protests, fueled 
in part by the Russian incursion into South Ossetia in August 2008. 
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Declining Support for Bush's Foreign Policy 
Despite these modifications in personnel and policy actions, sharp doubts 
continued to arise among foreign leaders and publics about the Bush ad-
ministration and its policy approach. In turn, a majority of the American 
public and numerous members of Congress raised doubts about the direc-
tion of foreign policy, especially as reflected in the Iraq war. 
Continuing Criticism from Abroad 
Skepticism about any real change in direction by the Bush administration 
was largely driven by the continued unpopularity of the Iraq war (and the 
unilateralist approach that it reflected), but it was also driven by Bush's 
rhetoric and personal unpopularity. Any goodwill generated after 9/11 
among the European public, for example, quickly dissipated in the pre-
lude to the Iraq war, and it did not rebound for the remainder of Bush's 
presidency. In March 2003, just before the start of the Iraq war, only 48 
percent of the public in Britain, 34 percent in Italy, 25 percent in Ger-
many, 31 percent in France, and 14 percent in Spain expressed a favorable 
view of the United States (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2003, 19). Three 
years later, and more than a year into President Bush's second term (April 
2006), the favorable perception percentages of the United States had im-
proved only slightly among key European allies; 56 percent of Britons, 39 
percent of the French, 37 percent of the Germans, and 23 percent of the 
Spanish expressed favorable opinions of the United States. This skepti-
cism or downright opposition, of course, was not confined to Europeans. 
In the 2006 Pew survey of global attitudes toward the United States, in 
only three countries of the ten surveyed outside Europe did a majority of 
the publics view the United States favorably; these were Japan, India, and 
Nigeria. The rest (Russia, Indonesia, Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey, and 
China) had favorability ratings of the United States ranging from 12 per-
cent positive in Turkey to 47 percent positive in China (Pew Global Atti-
tudes Project 2006, 1). 
President Bush's personal unpopularity undoubtedly continued to 
cloud any change in policy direction. In a BBC World Service poll (2005), 
in only three countries (out of twenty-two surveyed) did a majority or a 
plurality view Bush's reelection positively; these were India, the Philip-
pines, and Poland. The rest, including five European countries, viewed the 
reelection of Bush as "negative for peace and security for the world." 
This skepticism of key European publics (and others) was also mir-
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rored at the governmental level. Only a few European states were will-
ing to provide much assistance in the effort to stabilize Iraq. Even among 
those that did, they later withdrew or announced their intention to with-
draw their forces, often because of opposition at home. Still, some of the 
states most critical of the United States over initiating the Iraq war have 
been willing to train Iraqi security personnel (e.g., Germany) and have 
provided some resources for reconstruction (e.g., France). Yet there clearly 
were barriers to how far they would go to endorse the Bush administra-
tion's foreign policy approach. With new leaders elected in Germany in 
November 2005 (Angela Merkel) and in France in May 2007 (Nicolas 
Sarkozy) and with the selection of Gordon Brown to replace Tony Blair 
as prime minister in Britain during 2007, President Bush had a new set 
of leaders who were generally more willing to cooperate with the United 
States than those (except for Blair) at the height of the Iraq war. None-
theless, the Iraq war hovered over other nations moving too close to the 
United States-and it continued to impinge upon any enthusiastic alli-
ance support for the administration. 
Emergent Criticism at Home 
Although the Bush administration was able to win the White House and 
keep Republican control of Congress in the 2004 elections based in part 
on its antiterrorism policy, domestic support for the president and his Iraq 
policy quickly began to erode by mid-2005. Indeed, public approval of 
the president dropped significantly after the initiation of that war, and by 
2008, it hovered at about 30 percent. Since March 2005, when Bush's ap-
proval rating dropped to 45 percent, there were only two instances in the 
weekly Gallup tracking polls (April 4-7, 2005, and May 2-5, 2005) when 
the president's approval rating was at 50 percent. Instead, the trend was 
consistently downward from March 2005, with a low (up to that time) of 
31 percent in the polling of May 5-7, 2006 (Gallup poll 2008b). With the 
full formation of the Iraqi government and the killing of Abu al-Zarqawi, 
al-Qaida's leader in Iraq, in 2006, President Bush's approval rating inched 
back up a bit to the high-30 percent level and even to 42 percent, but it 
eroded to 29 percent in July 2007 and, in April 2008, it dropped to 28 per-
cent (Newport 2008). In all, a majority of the public throughout most of 
Bush's second term disapproved of his job performance-and much of that 
disapproval, of course, was related to foreign policy, specifically, to Iraq. 
The number of people who thought that sending troops to Iraq was 
a good idea steadily eroded during Bush's second term, and by its con-
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clusion, a large majority believed it to have been a mistake. As early as 
June 2004, a majority of the public in Gallup tracking polls judged that 
the United States "made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq.n Over the 
next year, though, a slim majority usually disagreed with this statement, 
but, after June 2005, a majority of the public consistently viewed the ac-
tion as a "mistake," with only an exception or two (Newport 2006). By 
April 2008, 58 percent of the public viewed the Iraq war as a mistake, 
and public disapproval remained at about that level through the balance 
of the Bush term. In this sense, while majority opposition to Iraq policy 
was probably more recent than many might believe, the level of popular 
belief that the invasion was a mistake remained quite stable from 2005 
through 2008. Moreover, in his comparison of the Iraq, Vietnam, and Ko-
rean wars, political scientist John Mueller reports that the most striking 
aspect is how much more quickly domestic support for the Iraq war faded 
(Mueller 2008, 116). 
David Broder (2006), the dean of the Washington press corps, sum-
marized the problems facing the administration by putting himself in the 
president's position and asking himself how the world looked from this 
vantage point. His answer was a single word: "trouble." Indeed, across the 
foreign policy horizon in 2006-from Mexico and Canada in the Western 
Hemisphere; to China, North Korea, and Russia in Asia and Europe; and 
to Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Lebanon in the Middle East-the administration 
was encountering trouble in pursuing its foreign policy objectives. More 
importantly, as Broder noted, the administration seemed to lack good 
ideas for addressing these festering challenges around the world. 
In an intriguing analysis in the same period, political scientist Steven 
Schier (2006) points to the Iraq war to account for why things went so 
badly for the administration. That is, he charted the number of positive 
and negative events, whether discretionary events (where the president 
had an impact) or nondiscretionary events (where he had no direct im-
pact), and found, not surprisingly, that the Iraq war was a clear turning 
point for the administration. What is so compelling, though, is the dra-
matic decline in the ratio of positive to negative events before and after the 
initiation of the war. Overall, discretionary events were at a 4-to-1 ratio 
(positive to negative) from 2001 to 2005, but the number of positive events 
declined from 2003 onward. The nondiscretionary events were at a 1-to-4 
ratio (negative to positive) over the time period. The important message 
is how costly the Iraq war was for the administration both in events that 
it could affect and those that it could not. The "soft power" of the United 
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States (to borrow Joseph Nye's felicitous phrase) declined at home and 
abroad as a consequence of the Iraq war. 
During this same time period, congressional criticism of the Bush ad-
ministration's Iraq policy began to escalate on both sides of the aisle. Two 
military veterans in Congress dramatized the changing nature of the po-
litical environment and epitomized the growing opposition in that body. 
In late November 2005, Representative John Murtha (D-Pennsylvania}, 
the ranking Democrat on the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, a 
former marine, and a supporter of the Iraq war, broke with the Bush ad-
ministration and called for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq 
within six months: "The military has done everything that has been asked 
of them. The U.S. cannot accomplish anything further in Iraq militarily. 
It is time to bring the troops home" (from Nather 2005a, 3120). On the Re-
publican side, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Nebraska), a Vietnam veteran and 
a media favorite because of his outspokenness on the Bush administra-
tion's postwar Iraq policy (Nather 2005b, 2834), became an increasingly 
vocal critic. One profile of Hagel characterized his determination on the 
Iraq issue in this way: "He did not let up, despite extreme pressure from 
party leaders to cool it" (CQ Weekly Online 2006, 2926). These members 
of Congress were not alone, and Congress's push for greater White House 
accountability on the Iraq war escalated in 2005 and 2006. As a result, the 
2006 congressional elections quickly became a referendum on Iraq policy 
specifically and the Bush approach to foreign policy more generally. 
A Change in Course? 
In a news conference the day after the 2006 congressional elections, Presi-
dent Bush characterized the results as a "thumping" for his party. Repub-
licans lost six seats in the Senate and thirty seats in the House, and both 
chambers changed from Republican to Democratic control. In short or-
der, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld resigned, a new commander 
was appointed in Iraq, and the president considered a new Iraq strategy. A 
month later, the Iraq Study Group, an independent, bipartisan group led 
by former secretary of state James Baker and former congressional repre-
sentative Lee Hamilton, issued its report, which contained seventy-nine 
recommendations outlining "the way forward in Iraq." The thrust of these 
recommendations was a call for the United States to launch "a new dip-
lomatic initiative to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq 
and the region" and to "adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people 
to take control of their own destiny." The U.S. military "should evolve into 
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one of supporting the Iraqi military," the report concluded, with the prin-
cipal responsibility left to the Iraqis themselves. Furthermore, the Ameri-
can government "should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support the 
achievement of specific objectives ... on national reconciliation, secu-
rity, and governance" (Baker and Hamilton 2006). In short, the Iraq Study 
Group called for new diplomatic initiatives toward Iraq's neighbors, re-
duced American military involvement within Iraq except for training and 
some embedded units, enhanced Iraqi progress in internal reconciliation 
among religious groups, and improved national governance. 
While President Bush indicated that he would carefully review the 
Iraq Study Group's recommendations, he rather quickly moved in a dif-
ferent direction. In early 2007, the president embraced a new Iraq strategy 
prepared by General David Petraeus, the coalition commander in Iraq. 
Popularly called the "surge strategy," this new approach called for send-
ing an additional twenty-one thousand American troops to Iraq in an ef-
fort to quell the sectarian violence and thus provide the Iraqi government 
with time to make progress on internal political reconciliation. This pol-
icy change provoked sharp criticism from Congress. Senator Hagel, for 
example, called the president's speech about the surge strategy "the most 
dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam" (from 
Nather 2007a, i70). The House of Representatives subsequently passed a 
nonbinding resolution disapproving surge, although the Senate failed to 
follow suit. 
In the ensuing months of 2007, the Democratic majority made vari-
ous attempts to cut off funding for Iraq and to set a date for American 
withdrawal, all in response to the president's action and as part of its per-
ceived election mandate. One supplemental Iraq war funding measure 
was passed by Congress in late April 2007 with language requiring the 
withdrawal of troops if certain "benchmarks" were not achieved. Presi-
dent Bush quickly vetoed this bill on May 1, 2007, and the House upheld 
his veto a day later (Higa and Donnelly 2007; Clarke 2007). While the veto 
pen proved important, the president successfully staved off congressional 
actions for other reasons as well. President Bush was largely able to main-
tain the support of his Republican colleagues in the House and Senate, 
even in the face of rather united Democratic opposition. The rules in the 
Senate require sixty votes of that body to end filibuster on controversial 
matters, and that procedure also aided the president. Furthermore, the 
threat of a presidential veto for any Iraq legislation also supported Bush's 
position. Finally, and importantly, Democrats (and Republicans) had to 
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face the real difficulty of cutting off funds for the troops in the field and 
also to gauge the political backlash that such action might create among 
their constituents back home. 
Although the surge strategy proved successful in dampening sectar-
ian violence in 2007 and into 2008, the Iraqi government's progress on 
fostering national reconciliation among the competing sectarian groups 
was markedly slow, as documented in an independent assessment by the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and as confirmed by Gen-
eral Petraeus's testimony to Congress on two different occasions. By April 
2008, moreover, because of some increase in Iraqi violence, General Pe-
traeus was forced to ask for a "pause" in the draw-down of the surge forces 
for a year to consolidate the progress that had been achieved. Such actions, 
along with the continuing loss of American lives in Iraq, made foreign 
policy, and specifically the Iraq war, a central issue in the 2008 presiden-
tial campaign. In this sense, more than five years after the start of the war, 
Iraq cast a long shadow over those contending for the highest office in the 
land and over American foreign policy more generally. 
Even as Iraq was moving toward stability by the end of 2008, the situ-
ation in Afghanistan had taken a turn for the worse. The increase in the 
number of killings, the expansion of civil unrest, and the limited terri-
torial control by the central government reflected a deteriorating situa-
tion. Both the outgoing Bush administration and the incoming Obama 
administration were looking to increase the number of American troops 
in Afghanistan and were reviewing new strategies for dealing with the 
situation. In this sense, the initial site of success in the war on terrorism 
was now somewhat in doubt. 
The Foreign Policy Legacies of the Bush Years 
What, then, are the principal foreign policy legacies of the George W. Bush 
administration across its two terms? How did its foreign policy actions 
impact the United States and the rest of the world? What policy challenges 
does it leave for future administrations? In large measure, of course, the 
Bush administration's response to 9/11 and to Iraq and the Iraq war shape 
the nature of its legacy in foreign policy. 
The Bush administration came to office committed to creating a "dis-
tinctly American internationalism" in which it sought to limit Ameri-
can involvement abroad and to pursue a narrower interpretation of the 
national interest than the Clinton administration had used. In effect, 
this approach was a commitment to classical realism where relative ca-
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pabilities largely shaped actions abroad and relations with major pow-
ers dominated the agenda. With 9/u, however, the Bush administration 
jettisoned its classical realist approach and embraced defensive realism, 
where foreign policy actions were driven primarily by the threat environ-
ment. When terrorism intensified the threat environment, the adminis-
tration was compelled to pursue a more globalist strategy than it initially 
envisioned. This new environment, too, saw the administration embrace 
elements of idealism by pursuing regime change abroad, most notably re-
flected in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by providing military 
support to several states threatened by internal (and terrorist) insurgen-
cies (e.g., the former Soviet republic of Georgia and the Philippines). 
The 9/11 attacks had a profound effect on several dimensions of Ameri-
can foreign policy. On the policymaking side, 9/11 enhanced the author-
ity of the president, increased the degree of congressional deference to the 
executive, rallied public opinion behind the actions of the president, and. 
in a sense, narrowed America's foreign policy agenda. On the content side, 
9/11 altered some initial foreign policy assumptions that the Bush admin-
istration brought to the office (e.g., opposition to humanitarian interven-
tions and a global strategy) and confirmed others (e.g., the greater need 
for hard power over soft power; the importance of security issues over 
political and economic issues). At the same time, 9/11 also seemingly af-
forded the Bush administration the opportunity to forge a "grand strat-
egy" of foreign policy for the years ahead. That strategy was grounded in 
the belief that terrorism and rogue states were the major adversaries of 
the United States and that a "coalition of the willing" should be developed 
worldwide to isolate and defeat those adversaries. Importantly, too, the 
United States reserved the right to act alone if necessary and to engage in 
preemptive actions, especially when weapons of mass destruction were 
in the hands of adversaries. The actions against the Taliban and al-Qaida 
in Afghanistan and the war with Iraq illustrate differing dimensions of 
this new strategy. 
The post-9/11 approach of the George W. Bush administration repre-
sents a determined effort to restore a more consistent, coherent, and uni-
versal foreign policy approach, an approach that more closely resembled 
that of the early years of his father's immediate predecessor, Ronald Rea-
gan, than of any other recent president. Although the contexts were mark-
edly different in the early 1980s and the early years of the new century, the 
ideology and universal nature of American actions during each o f these 
administrations-one staunchly anticommunist, the other, staunchh 
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anti-terrorist-are strikingly similar for each administration. Both were 
strongly committed to setting a clear course to direct American actions 
abroad, and both were willing to act alone and use America's military ca-
pacity, if necessary. 
The Iraq war dramatically affected the transformative foreign policy 
that the Bush administration initiated after 9/11. The contested rationale 
for the Iraq invasion over the existence of weapons of mass destruction 
in the hands of a rogue state, the failure of reconstruction planning and 
implementation after the initial invasion, and the difficulties of bring-
ing democracy to a country fraught with sectarian divisions brought into 
serious question the transformative nature of Bush's foreign policy ap-
proach. Furthermore, the largely unilateral nature of the Iraqi invasion-
despite the "coalition of the willing" veneer-the opposition of key allies, 
and the failure to gain the endorsement of the United Nations further 
tarnished America's image abroad and weakened its attractiveness in the 
international community. In short, the transformative foreign policy that 
the administration attempted to undertake was largely left fallow by ac-
tions and events surrounding Iraq and the Iraq war. More than five years 
after that invasion, America's global reputation remained weakened, and 
the administration's vision of promoting both a grand strategy against 
international terrorism and wide-ranging democracy had been seriously 
compromised. 
To be sure, the administration sought to recast its foreign policy ap-
proach at the beginning of its second term to focus on promoting democ-
racy and eliminating tyranny worldwide. The administration undertook 
an effort to modify its approach-by removing or having key neoconser-
vative advisers resign, by reaching out to the Europeans, and by initiating 
a number of multilateral diplomatic efforts toward the other "axis of evil" 
states-Iran and North Korea-and toward other international concerns, 
such as Darfur and the Middle East. Yet these new initiatives were largely 
lost because of the deteriorating situation in Iraq, the "stay-the-course" 
approach, and the administration's continued embrace of the rhetoric of 
the immediate post-9/n period. Because of the dominance of the Iraq is-
sue and the caricatured way in which the president was portrayed, the 
Bush administration, and the United States more generally, had a difficult 
time exercising international influence. In this sense, America's global 
reputation was yet another casualty of the Iraq war. 
The reliance on unilateralism and preemptive action by the Bush ad-
ministration (along with its strident rhetoric in these areas) had the effect 
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of tarnishing American images abroad and, more generally, eroding its 
"soft power"-the attractiveness of its values and culture and the ability 
to influence international actions more indirectly. Changes in these two 
areas by the Obama administration- and some important policy changes 
as well- would likely have the important benefit of improving America's 
global reputation and restoring its policy influence. Indeed, in the early 
days of the new administration, President Obama sought to do just that. 
He issued an executive order seeking to close the prison at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, within one year and met with his top military officers to d is-
cuss ending America's combat role in Iraq within sixteen months. Further, 
the economic meltdown in the United States and worldwide at the end of 
2008 and into 2009 also required a nation more engaged multilaterally 
to address these shared economic problems. In all, a changed image-
and the appeal of America's values and culture-will likely enhance the 
prospects of the promotion of democratic values abroad, but the Obama 
administration should harbor no illusions regarding the challenges of ad-
vancing democracy in other countries, as the U.S. experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan so dramatically reveals. 
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